

GPS Signal Authentication using QZSS Signal

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Can You Trust GPS Position & Time Data?


Yes, You can...

...But Need to Verify

Because of Spoofing Issues

GPS Spoofing Poses Risk of Future Havoc

NOV 28, 2016



GPS 'Spoofing' is No Joke: Dangers of GPS Data Hacking Realized

GNSS spoofing will attain virus status, warns expert – GPS World

Hacking Global Positioning System with GPS 'Spoofing' Can Lead To Fatalities

<http://www.techworm.net/2016/11/gps-spoofing-dangers-gps-data-hacking.html>

Dangers of GPS spoofing and hacking for location based services

Faking of GPS Data a growing and potentially lethal danger – The Japan Times, FB

Japan Supreme Court Ruling: GPS Tracking is Illegal without Warrant

15th March 2017

New rules might be implemented to make

GPS tracking legal with warrant

But, there is also

fear of GPS Signal Spoofing.


GPS捜査 令状なし違法



GPS捜査訴訟の上告審判決が言い渡された最高裁大法廷。中央は、寺田逸郎裁判長—15日午後、東京都千代田区（伴龍二撮影）

What is Location Spoofing?


- Falsify Location Data as If it were True Location



Spoofing




TOKYO
Or
Hawaii?




Please watch
James Bond
Movie
"Tomorrow
Never
Dies"

This movie is all
about GPS
Spoofing

Software-Based GPS Signal Generator (Spoofer?)




Software Source available from Dr. Ebinuma, Chubu University



What is GPS Signal Authentication?

- To authenticate or verify that a GPS signal in the receiver is actually from a GPS satellite.





GPS Signal Authentication is necessary to detect SPOOF Signals


GPS Spoofing in Black Sea?

24th June 2017

A GPS spoofing attack in June, involving over 20 vessels in the Black Sea, has been reported. Probably the first official record of spoofing. More.....



SPOOFing a Car: Is he driving the car?




Spoofing Methods

Self-Spoofing
Connect by cable, No Real Signal,


Self-Spoofing
Connect by cable, Real Signal Present

Self or 3rd Party Spoofing
Over the air transmission


Spoofing Level 0




Spoofing Level 1



Spoofing Level 2




Why Authentication is Necessary ?



ISO/TC204 WG-18

- **Discussions in ISO/TC-204, WG18 from this year**
 - **To Draft regulations for ITS-S related with PVT Data**




The screenshot shows the ISO website page for ISO/TC 204. The page features the ISO logo and the text "International Organization for Standardization" and "Great things happen when the world agrees". The navigation menu includes "Standards", "All about ISO", "Taking part", and "Store". The breadcrumb trail is "Home > Taking part > Who develops standards > Technical Committees > ISO/TC 204". The main heading is "ISO/TC 204" with the subtitle "Intelligent transport systems". The "About" section lists the secretariat as ANSI and the secretary as Mr Adrian Guan. The "Quick links" section includes "Work programme" and "Drafts and new work items".

We can solve the problem of Spoofing by Signal Authentication

Concept of Signal Authentication


**Broadcast a Digital Signature Data
in the QZSS Navigation Message**

Authentication System Architecture




Authentication System: Control Segment Development

QZSS
Monitoring Stations



Get a Portion of NAV Data Bits from visible GPS, QZSS

Interface to access QZSS monitoring stations and receive NAV Data



Reference Authentication NAV Data



Generate Keys

Make L1S NAV MSG 250bit

Interface to upload Encrypted Digital Signature via L1S Message to QZSS Control System

Interface to upload Public Key via L1S Message to QZSS Control System



Digital Signature Generation for Authentication

GNSS Signal Authentication

File

Test Data Receiver Connection File Input



Communication Setup

Serial, COM16

File Output


Output File: C:/Dinesh/QZSS_AUTH_RESEARCH/SystemDevelopment/SSAGE/GNSS_Auth_bin_20171204/GNSS_Auth_bin/20171204-1.csv

Satellite ID	5
Subframe No.	1
TOW	185796
RAND	3C7B16DA00057EA47305
HASH	054C79C50C60A2F2446CA92186ACF4B97CA5F7F2
Private Key	DF6266778D1DA835275709BF01AF60F51E91606851C9F1C8
Public Key X	592288D2E37D46671DD004A702FD208BE306CA936787AF06
Public Key Y	19D49B6E4BC5251364405885E6C30DA5883F79C59149170E
Signature	D581BDE05F21C1647F035CF98A29CC86FE9FFEEFB02365308AF48D6C78000C01C1080BD47DB1F6F9D15110F0F69ECD25
L1S Message	9A04053DF7E0EFF817C8F0591FC0D7FEE28AF3EDFFE7FFBEC08D94C80000000
Satellite ID	13
Subframe No.	1
TOW	185796
RAND	3C7B16DA7FFF79CDF70D
HASH	3F586F128131479BE57E30133629BD7AC067F8F3
Private Key	DF6266778D1DA835275709BF01AF60F51E91606851C9F1C8
Public Key X	592288D2E37D46671DD004A702FD208BE306CA936787AF06
Public Key Y	19D49B6E4BC5251364405885E6C30DA5883F79C59149170E
Signature	40E0DFE3AA2FAF279165F99FF36C875F83D8B1D8255A68A48CF45E5C481DC53A0D3C39E4F084BAE99E9F867A7AFE461D
L1S Message	9A040D3DF6F8F7F8EA8BEBC9E459FEE7FCDBE1D7E0F6ECF609569AE900000000
Satellite ID	15
Subframe No.	5
TOW	185790
RAND	
HASH	
Private Key	DF6266778D1DA835275709BF01AF60F51E91606851C9F1C8
Public Key X	592288D2E37D46671DD004A702FD208BE306CA936787AF06
Public Key Y	19D49B6E4BC5251364405885E6C30DA5883F79C59149170E
Signature	
L1S Message	





Bytes Received:1379543

Authentication System: User Segment



Real-time Authentication Test by Car Driving



ATH/P:24/S:1

Variable	Value
TIME	07:28:56
PRN_ID	24
NO of SAT	5
LONGITUDE	
LATITUDE	
IODC	
DIST_T[m]	1026.66
DIST_P[m]	5.197
STATUS	1

Directions: [To here](#) - [From here](#)

ATH/P:28/S:2

Variable	Value
TIME	07:28:57
PRN_ID	28
NO of SAT	5
LONGITUDE	
LATITUDE	
IODC	
DIST_T[m]	1030.07
DIST_P[m]	3.41
STATUS	2

Directions: [To here](#) - [From here](#)

ATH/P:193/S:1

Variable	Value
TIME	07:28:58
PRN_ID	193
NO of SAT	5
LONGITUDE	
LATITUDE	
IODC	
DIST_T[m]	1034.32
DIST_P[m]	4.25
STATUS	1

Directions: [To here](#) - [From here](#)

Authentication Signal is broadcasted from QZSS L1S signal for 3 months on various occasions for Live Authentication Test.

Thanks to JAXA for broadcasting Test Authentication Signal.

Summary

- **QZSS Signals can be used to Authenticate GPS and QZSS Signals**
 - **Other GNSS signals also possible**
- **This method can be implemented without any impact on HW**
 - **Only Software/Firmware modification in the control and user system**