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Use of nuclear power sources in outer space**

## **Revised draft Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space**

### **Note by the Secretariat**

1. The Joint Expert Group of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established at the forty-fourth session of the Subcommittee to develop an international technically based framework of goals and recommendations for the safety of planned and currently foreseeable nuclear power source applications in outer space, held three meetings in 2008, in February, June and October. At those meetings, the Joint Expert Group considered comments on the text of the draft Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space received from member States of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, IAEA member States, the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and the IAEA safety standards committees. This work resulted in a new, updated text of the draft Safety Framework that, while being made available to the Subcommittee in document A/AC.105/C.1/L.292/Rev.2, had not yet been approved by the Joint Expert Group.
2. At the forty-sixth session of the Subcommittee, held in Vienna from 9 to 20 February 2009, the Joint Expert Group finalized the text of the draft Safety Framework for consideration by the Working Group on the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space of the Subcommittee.
3. The attached document contains the text of the revised draft Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space.



# **Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space**

## **Preface**

Nuclear power sources (NPS) for use in outer space have been developed and used in space applications where unique mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal management precluded the use of non-nuclear power sources. Such missions have included interplanetary missions to the outer limits of the Solar System, for which solar panels were not suitable as a source of electrical power because of the long duration of these missions at great distances from the Sun.

According to current knowledge and capabilities, space NPS are the only viable energy option to power some space missions and significantly enhance others. Several ongoing and foreseeable missions would not be possible without the use of space NPS. The designs of NPS for use in outer space have included radioisotope power systems (for example, radioisotope thermoelectric generators and radioisotope heater units) and nuclear reactor systems. Reactors for power or propulsion are contemplated for scientific and exploration missions, for example to the Moon, Mars and other Solar System destinations, and for other missions requiring high power (e.g. communications, inter-orbital space tugs). The presence of radioactive materials or nuclear fuels in space NPS and their consequent potential for harm to people and the environment in Earth's biosphere due to an accident require that safety should always be an inherent part of the design and application of space NPS.

NPS applications in outer space have unique safety considerations compared with terrestrial applications. Unlike many terrestrial nuclear applications, space applications tend to be used infrequently and their requirements can vary significantly depending upon the specific mission. Mission launch and outer space operational requirements impose size, mass and other space environment limitations not present for many terrestrial nuclear facilities. For some applications, space NPS must operate autonomously at great distances from Earth in harsh environments. Potential accident conditions resulting from launch failures and inadvertent re-entry could expose NPS to extreme physical conditions. These and other unique safety considerations for the use of space NPS are significantly different from those for terrestrial nuclear systems and are not addressed in safety guidance for terrestrial nuclear applications.

After a period of initial discussion and preparation, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed in 2007 to jointly draft a safety framework for NPS applications in outer space. This partnership integrated the expertise of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in the use of space NPS with the well-established procedures of IAEA for developing safety standards pertaining to nuclear safety of terrestrial applications. The Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space represents a technical consensus of both bodies.

The Safety Framework is intended to be utilized as a guide for national purposes. As such, it provides voluntary guidance and is not legally binding under international law.

The Safety Framework is not a publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series, but it is intended to complement the Safety Standards Series by providing high-level guidance that addresses unique nuclear safety considerations for relevant launch, operation and end-of-service mission phases of space NPS applications. It complements existing national and international safety guidance and standards pertaining to terrestrial activities that involve the design, manufacture, testing and transportation of space NPS. The Safety Framework has been developed with due consideration for relevant principles and treaties. The Safety Framework does not supplement, alter or interpret any of those principles or treaties.

The focus of the Safety Framework is the protection of people and the environment in Earth's biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, operation and end-of-service mission phases of space NPS applications. The protection of humans in space is an area of ongoing research and is beyond the scope of the Safety Framework. Similarly, the protection of environments of other celestial bodies remains beyond the scope of the Safety Framework.

Safety terms used in the Safety Framework are defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary. As used herein, the term "nuclear safety" includes radiation safety and radiation protection. Additional terms specific to space NPS applications are defined in the section of the Safety Framework entitled "Glossary of terms".

In summary, the purpose of the Safety Framework is to promote the safety of NPS applications in outer space; as such, it applies to all space NPS applications without prejudice.

The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and IAEA wish to express their appreciation to all those who assisted in the drafting and review of the text of the Safety Framework and in the process of reaching consensus.

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## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background

Nuclear power sources (NPS) for use in outer space<sup>1</sup> have been developed and used on spacecraft where unique mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal management precluded the use of non-nuclear power sources. Such missions have included interplanetary missions to the outer limits of the Solar System, for which solar panels were not suitable as a source of electrical power because of the long duration of the mission at great distances from the Sun.

The designs of space NPS have included radioisotope power systems (including radioisotope thermoelectric generators and radioisotope heater units) and nuclear reactor systems. Radioisotope power systems are currently in use, and their continued use is expected. Foreseeable missions to Mars by space agencies might use space radioisotope power systems. Reactors for power or propulsion are contemplated for scientific and exploration missions, for example to the Moon, Mars and other Solar System destinations, and for other missions requiring high power (e.g. communications, inter-orbital space tugs). Space NPS have enabled several ongoing missions. According to current knowledge and capabilities, space NPS are the only viable energy option to power some foreseeable space missions and significantly enhance others.

Both normal operating and potential accident conditions for space NPS applications, through the launch, operation and end-of-service phases, are radically different from the conditions for terrestrial applications. The launch and outer space environments create very different safety design and operational criteria for space NPS. Furthermore, space mission requirements lead to unique mission-specific designs for space NPS, spacecraft, launch systems and mission operations.

The presence of radioactive materials or nuclear fuels in space NPS and their consequent potential for harm to people and the environment in Earth's biosphere due to an accident require that safety must always be an inherent part of the design and application of space NPS. Safety (i.e. protection of people and the

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<sup>1</sup> As used herein, the term "outer space" is synonymous with "space".

environment<sup>2</sup>) should focus on the entire application and not only on the space NPS component. All elements of the application could affect the nuclear aspects of safety. Therefore, safety needs to be addressed in the context of the entire space NPS application, which includes the space NPS, spacecraft, launch system, mission design and flight rules.

### **1.2. Purpose**

The purpose of this publication is to provide high-level guidance in the form of a model safety framework. The framework provides a foundation for the development of national and international intergovernmental safety frameworks while allowing for flexibility in adapting such frameworks to specific space NPS applications and organizational structures. Such national and international intergovernmental frameworks should include both technical and programmatic elements to mitigate risks arising from the use of space NPS. Implementation of such frameworks not only would provide assurance to the global public that space NPS applications would be launched and used in a safe manner, but could also facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation on space missions using NPS. The guidance provided herein reflects an international consensus on measures needed to achieve safety and applies to all space NPS applications without prejudice.

### **1.3. Scope**

The Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space focuses on safety for relevant launch, operation and end-of-service phases of space NPS applications. High-level guidance is provided for both the programmatic and technical aspects of safety, including the design and application of space NPS. However, detailed usage of this guidance depends on the particular design and application. Implementation of the guidance provided in the Safety Framework would supplement existing standards that cover other aspects of space NPS applications. For example, activities occurring during the terrestrial phase of space NPS applications, such as development, testing, manufacturing, handling and transportation, are addressed in national and international standards relating to terrestrial nuclear installations and activities. Similarly, non-nuclear safety aspects of space NPS applications are addressed in relevant safety standards of governments and international intergovernmental organizations (e.g. regional space agencies).

A substantial body of knowledge exists for establishing a space NPS application safety framework for people and the environment in Earth's biosphere. However, comparable scientific data do not yet exist that would provide a technically sound basis for developing a space NPS application framework for protecting humans in the unique conditions in space and beyond Earth's biosphere. Therefore, the protection in space of humans involved in missions that use space NPS applications is beyond the scope of the Safety Framework. Similarly, the protection of environments of other celestial bodies remains beyond the scope of the Safety Framework.

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<sup>2</sup> As used herein, the term "people and the environment" is synonymous with the term "people and the environment in Earth's biosphere".

## **2. Safety objective**

*The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment in Earth's biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, operation and end-of-service phases of space nuclear power source applications.*

Governments, international intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental entities that authorize, approve or conduct space NPS applications should take measures to ensure that people (individually and collectively) and the environment are protected without unduly limiting the uses of space NPS applications.

Guidance for satisfying the fundamental safety objective is grouped into three categories: guidance for governments (section 3 below) applies to governments and relevant international intergovernmental organizations that authorize, approve or conduct space NPS missions; guidance for management (section 4 below) applies to the management of the organization that conducts space NPS missions; and technical guidance (section 5 below) applies to the design, development and mission phases of space NPS applications.

## **3. Guidance for governments**

This section provides guidance for governments and relevant international intergovernmental organizations (e.g. regional space agencies) that authorize, approve or conduct space NPS missions. Governmental responsibilities include establishing safety policies, requirements and processes; ensuring compliance with those policies, requirements and processes; ensuring that there is acceptable justification for using a space NPS when weighed against other alternatives; establishing a formal mission launch authorization process; and preparing for and responding to emergencies. For multinational or multiorganizational missions, governing instruments should define clearly the allocation of these responsibilities.

### **3.1. Safety policies, requirements and processes**

*Governments that authorize or approve space nuclear power source missions should establish safety policies, requirements and processes.*

Governments and relevant international intergovernmental organizations that authorize or approve space NPS missions, whether such missions are conducted by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, should establish and ensure compliance with their respective safety policies, requirements and processes to satisfy the fundamental safety objective and fulfil their safety requirements.

### **3.2. Justification for space nuclear power source applications**

*The government's mission approval process should verify that the rationale for using the space nuclear power source application has been appropriately justified.*

Space NPS applications may introduce risk to people and the environment. For this reason, governments and relevant international intergovernmental organizations that authorize, approve or conduct space NPS missions should ensure that the rationale for each space NPS application considers alternatives and is appropriately justified. The process should consider benefits and risks to people and the environment

related to relevant launch, operation and end-of-service phases of the space NPS application.

### **3.3. Mission launch authorization**

*A mission launch authorization process for space nuclear power source applications should be established and sustained.*

The government that oversees and authorizes the launch operations for space NPS missions should establish a mission launch authorization process focused on nuclear safety aspects. The process should include an evaluation of all relevant information and considerations from other participating organizations. The mission launch authorization process should supplement the authorization processes covering non-nuclear and terrestrial aspects of launch safety. An independent safety evaluation (i.e. a review, independent of the management organization conducting the mission, of the adequacy and validity of the safety case) should be an integral part of the authorization process. The independent safety evaluation should consider the entire space NPS application – including the space NPS, spacecraft, launch system, mission design and flight rules – in assessing the risk to people and the environment from relevant launch, operation and end-of-service phases of the space mission.

### **3.4. Emergency preparedness and response**

*Preparations should be made to respond to potential emergencies involving a space nuclear power source.*

Governments and relevant international intergovernmental organizations that authorize, approve or conduct space NPS missions should be prepared to respond rapidly to launch and mission emergencies that may result in radiation exposure of people and radioactive contamination of Earth's environment. Emergency preparedness activities include emergency planning, training, rehearsals and development of procedures and communication protocols, including the drafting of potential accident notifications. Emergency response plans should be designed so as to restrict radioactive contamination and radiation exposure.

## **4. Guidance for management**

This section provides guidance for management of the organizations involved in space NPS applications. In the context of the Safety Framework, management should comply with governmental and relevant intergovernmental safety policies, requirements and processes to satisfy the fundamental safety objective. Management responsibilities include accepting prime responsibility for safety, ensuring the availability of adequate resources for safety and promoting and sustaining a robust safety culture at all organizational levels.

### **4.1. Responsibility for safety**

*The prime responsibility for safety should rest with the organization that conducts the space nuclear power source mission.*

The organization that conducts the space NPS mission has the prime responsibility for safety. That organization should include, or have formal arrangements with,

all relevant participants in the mission (spacecraft provider, launch vehicle provider, NPS provider, launch site provider etc.) for satisfying the safety requirements established for the space NPS application.

Specific safety responsibilities for management should include the following:

- (a) Establishing and maintaining the necessary technical competencies;
- (b) Providing adequate training and information to all relevant participants;
- (c) Establishing procedures to promote safety under all reasonably foreseeable conditions;
- (d) Developing specific safety requirements, as appropriate, for missions that use space NPS;
- (e) Performing and documenting safety tests and analyses as input to the governmental mission launch authorization process;
- (f) Considering credible opposing views on safety matters;
- (g) Providing relevant, accurate and timely information to the public.

#### **4.2. Leadership and management for safety**

*Effective leadership and management for safety should be established and sustained in the organization that conducts the space nuclear power source mission.*

Leadership in safety matters should be demonstrated at the highest levels in the organization that conducts the mission. Management of safety should be integrated with the overall management of the mission. Management should develop, implement and maintain a safety culture that ensures safety and satisfies the requirements of the governmental mission launch authorization process.

The safety culture should include the following:

- (a) Clear lines of authority, responsibility and communication;
- (b) Active feedback and continuous improvement;
- (c) Individual and collective commitment to safety at all organizational levels;
- (d) Safety accountability of the organization and of individuals at all levels;
- (e) A questioning and learning attitude to discourage complacency with regard to safety.

### **5. Technical guidance**

This section provides technical guidance for organizations involved in space NPS applications. This guidance is pertinent to the design, development and mission phases of space NPS applications. It encompasses the following key areas for developing and providing the technical basis for the authorization and approval processes and for emergency preparedness and response:



- (a) Establishing and maintaining a nuclear safety design, test and analysis capability;
- (b) Applying that capability in the design, qualification and mission launch authorization processes of the space NPS application (i.e. space NPS, spacecraft, launch system, mission design and flight rules);
- (c) Assessing the radiation risks to people and the environment arising from potential accidents and ensuring that the risk is acceptable and as low as reasonably achievable;
- (d) Taking action to manage the consequences of potential accidents.

### **5.1. Technical competence in nuclear safety**

***Technical competence in nuclear safety should be established and maintained for space nuclear power source applications.***

Having technical competence in nuclear safety is vital for satisfying the safety objective. From the earliest point in the development of a space NPS application, organizations should establish, consistent with their responsibilities, nuclear safety design, test and analysis capabilities, including qualified individuals and facilities, as appropriate. Those capabilities should be maintained for the duration of the relevant phases of the space NPS missions.

Competence in nuclear safety should include:

- (a) Defining space NPS application accident scenarios and their estimated probabilities in a rigorous manner;
- (b) Characterizing the physical conditions to which the space NPS and its components could be exposed in normal operations, as well as potential accidents;
- (c) Assessing the potential consequences to people and the environment from potential accidents;
- (d) Identifying and assessing inherent and engineered safety features to reduce the risk of potential accidents to people and the environment.

### **5.2. Safety in design and development**

***Design and development processes should provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved.***

The underlying approach to satisfying the safety objective should be to reduce the risks from normal operations and potential accidents to as low a level as is reasonably achievable by establishing comprehensive design and development processes that integrate safety considerations in the context of the entire space NPS application (i.e. space NPS, spacecraft, launch system, mission design and flight rules). Nuclear safety should be considered from the earliest stages of design and development and throughout all mission phases. The design and development processes should include:

- (a) Identifying, evaluating and implementing design features, controls and preventive measures that:

- (i) Reduce the probability of potential accidents that could release radioactive material;
- (ii) Reduce the magnitude of potential releases and their potential consequences;
- (b) Incorporating lessons learned from prior experience;
- (c) Verifying and validating design safety features and controls through tests and analyses, as appropriate;
- (d) Using risk analysis to assess the effectiveness of design features and controls and to provide feedback to the design process;
- (e) Using design reviews to provide assurance of the safety of the design.

### **5.3. Risk assessments**

***Risk assessments should be conducted to characterize the radiation risks to people and the environment.***

The radiation risks to people and the environment from potential accidents during the launch and use of space NPS should be assessed and uncertainties quantified to the extent possible. Risk assessments are essential for the governmental mission authorization process.

### **5.4. Accident consequence mitigation**

***All practical efforts should be made to mitigate the consequences of potential accidents.***

As part of the safety process for space NPS applications, measures should be evaluated to mitigate the consequences of accidents with the potential to release radioactive material into Earth's environment. The necessary capabilities should be established and made available, as appropriate, for timely support of activities to mitigate the consequences of accidents, including:

- (a) Developing and implementing contingency plans to interrupt accident sequences that could lead to radiation hazards;
- (b) Determining whether a release of radioactive material has occurred;
- (c) Characterizing the location and nature of the release of radioactive material;
- (d) Characterizing the areas contaminated by radioactive materials;
- (e) Recommending protective measures to limit exposure of population groups in the affected areas;
- (f) Preparing relevant information regarding the accident for dissemination to the appropriate governments, international organizations and non-governmental entities and to the general public.

## 6. Glossary of terms

The glossary below defines terms that are specific to space NPS applications. General safety terms used in the Safety Framework are defined in the *IAEA Safety Glossary, 2007 Edition*.<sup>3</sup>

*End-of-service phase*: the period of time after the useful life of a spacecraft

*Flight rules*: a collection of pre-planned decisions to minimize the amount of real-time decision-making required for nominal and off-nominal situations affecting a mission

*Launch*: a set of actions at the launch site leading to the delivery of a spacecraft to a predetermined orbit or flight trajectory

*Launch phase*: the period of time that includes the following: pre-launch preparation at the launch site, lift-off, ascent, operation of upper (or boost) stages, payload deployment and any other action associated with delivery of a spacecraft to a predetermined orbit or flight trajectory

*Launch vehicle*: any propulsive vehicle including upper (or boost) stages constructed for placing a payload into space

*Launch system*: the launch vehicle, launch site infrastructure, supporting facilities, equipment and procedures required for launching a payload into space

*Mission*: launch and operation (including end-of-service aspects) of a payload (e.g. spacecraft) beyond Earth's biosphere for a specific purpose

*Mission approval*: permission by a governmental authority for activities to proceed for preparing a mission for launch and operation

*Mission design*: the design of a space mission's trajectory and manoeuvres based on mission objectives, launch vehicle and spacecraft capabilities and mission constraints

*Mission launch authorization*: permission by a governmental authority to launch and operate a mission

*Space nuclear power source*: a device that uses radioisotopes or a nuclear reactor for electrical power generation, heating or propulsion in a space application

*Space nuclear power source application*: the overall system (space nuclear power source, spacecraft, launch system, mission design, flight rules etc.) involved in conducting a space mission involving a space nuclear power source

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<sup>3</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 2007 Edition* (Vienna, 2007).