Initiatives in the UN hosted International Committee on GNSS (ICG)
Recommendation (adopted): Developing Resilience in critical infrastructure
Recommendation (pending): Public safety review of GNSS testing applications

Use of GPS by U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center: CAPTAIN Scott Calhoun, Commanding Officer U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center

Sharing and Crowdsourcing GNSS Data to Monitor and Protect the RF Environment: Mr. Mathieu Joerger, Assistant Professor, Kevin T. Crofton Department of Aerospace and Ocean Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virtual)

DOT Strategic Plan for GPS/GNSS Interference Detection: Mr. James Aviles, Analyst, PNT and Spectrum Management, U.S. Department of Transportation (Virtual)

Critical Infrastructure Dependency on PNT: Mr. Michael Roskind, Branch Chief, Strategic Defense Initiatives, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Virtual)
Interference Detection and Geo-Location Capabilities

Use of ADS-B for Interference Detection:
*Mr. Hamdi NASSAR, EUROCONTROL*

Characterization of ADS-B Performance Under GNSS Interference:
*Professor Dr. Todd Walter, Director, GNSS Laboratory, Aeronautics and Astronautics Department, Stanford University*

1630 Detecting GNSS Spoofing of ADS-B Equipped Aircraft Using INS:
*Professor Boris Pervan, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology (Virtual)*

Adjourn
TIME GUIDANCE for Network Operators, Chief Information Officers, and Chief Information Security Officers
Timing Guidance

- Lessons learned from a tabletop exercise

- Designed to help an organization accomplish the Position Navigation and Timing Profile processes

  - Identifying and protecting systems,
  - Networks, and assets;
  - Detecting and responding to an anomaly;
  - Recovering from a disruption.

Incorporating Resilience into GNSS Interference Detection and Mitigation

Recommendation of Committee Action: ICG-16 Adopted

To increase critical infrastructure resilience to GNSS disruptions and interference, the ICG recommends that Government IDM Policy should reinforce the need for resilience based on a three-prong approach:

1. (Service Aspect): National GNSS spectrum protection and enforcement and implementation of IDM capabilities;

2. (Hardware Aspect): PNT systems designed with resilient system architectures and systems incorporating cybersecurity principles for holistic approach to threats; and;

3. (End-User Aspect): End Users plan for and know how to respond to, withstand, operate through, and recover from PNT disruptions and interference, as well as understand and minimize the impact of PNT disruptions in downstream systems.
Testing approval public notification

Recommendation of Committee Action: Pending

In the interest of public safety, the members of WG-S recommend that the ICG support the establishment, by all nations, of a standardized and centralized process for each government by which organizations within each government’s jurisdiction can apply for authorization to conduct testing on GNSS frequencies.

Further, this process should institute a internal concurrence process for each government allowing designated internal agencies to review applications for safety issues related to times and locations of requested testing.

The process should culminate in public notification of authorized testing times and locations and a means for authorized authorities within each government to quickly bring a halt to testing if testing is creating problems that were not anticipated or expected during the test planning phase.
U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center

Use of AIS Data at USCG NAVCEN
Data Driven Decisions

- Waterways Utilization Studies
  - Port Access Route Study (PARS)
  - Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA)
  - Waterways Analysis Management System (WAMS)

- Adaptable Waterway Analysis
  - Commercial Space Operations
  - 5P Brief to White House Clean Energy Advisor
  - Great Lakes Ice Breaking
  - Field support for OGA coordination
Sharing and Crowdsourcing GNSS Data to Monitor and Protect the GNSS RF Environment

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December 2022 - 10th ICG Workshop on GNSS Spectrum Protection and Interference Detection and Mitigation
Way Forward

- There are numerous connected GNSS receiver networks that could be leverage for RFI monitoring
  - traffic management (ADS-B, AIS, in the near-term future: cars/trucks) and scientific purposes (CORS, IGS)
  - differential GNSS networks, cell phone towers (even cell phone users), etc.

- Suggestions --- we would improve GNSS RFI monitoring by:
  - designing messaging standards to include GNSS signal quality data fields (C/N0, AGC, RF front end bandwidth)
    - Radio Tech. Comm. for Marit. Serv.: RTCM SC-134, Integrity for GNSS-based High Accuracy Applications
    - NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) – message proposed by Dong Kyeong Lee (UC Boulder)
  - developing dedicated, robust data collection and low-latency sharing systems
  - coordinating data-monitoring efforts and alerting system
**US DOT IDM Joint Concept of Operations**

**SV OBSERVABLES**
- Space & Aviation Segments
- Automated Reports of GNSS Anomalies = SV Observables, ADS-B, Datalink, Voice for light GA non-datalink capable
- Data Sets collected from multiple vehicles.
- Timely processing of automated data from transport vehicle, AIS, Fixed Sites and other sources by 3rd party provides for timely notification of event-effected area

**ADS-B**
- (NAVcen)
- (Center)
- (TWR/TRACON)

**PIREPS**

**GNSS receivers feeds from Vessels, Vehicles, Facilities Affected**

**GNSS receivers feeds from Space Vehicles & Aircraft Affected**

**AIS**

**CORS**

**OEMs and Suppliers**

**Government Agencies (GA)**
- State Operators / Service Centers/Internal Stakeholders
- National International Stakeholder Communications

**Interagency Processing Center**
- COP Analysis, Cyber Assessments and Impact Notification
- Affected Area Heat Map
- Vessel, Vehicle & Fixed Building detection (low-cost or installed electronics) to notify users of potential jamming or spoofing including auto-alert report generation

**DOMESTIC EVENTS NETWORK (DEN)**

**JOINT TRAFFIC OPERATIONS COMMAND (JATOC)**

**NOTICES TO AIR MISSIONS (NOTAMS)**

**Action/advisories to Field Facilities**
Use of ADS-B for GNSS RFI Monitoring

IDM WS

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06/12/2022
Summary

- GNSS interferences continue to affect aviation operations and may increase further in the future
  - GNSS testing, CUAS, proliferation of jammers
  - GNSS RFI may escalate beyond “operational nuisance”
  - Importance of automatic detection and reporting to the relevant national authorities

- EUROCONTROL is developing monitoring capabilities
  - IOC and weekly updates: RFI detection and localisation using ADS-B
  - Objective is to move to a near real time tool and to combine with other data in order to support ATM ops
    - Impact on operations depends on the fleet capabilities and the available infrastructure: Importance of defining suitable contingency procedures taking into account those factors
    - Importance of continuous monitoring to enable timely reaction to a significant event and implement appropriate mitigation measures

- Exploit multi-mode strengths
  - ADS-B provides indirect monitor of GNSS RFI – already today
  - Additional aircraft, ground and space capabilities can provide independent confirmation
  - Standards: Work on going to define the “GNSS RFI detection and status downlink” functions

- Prepare the future
  - Robust multi-sensor positioning preventing a single point failure
  - Use of the RFI downlink function

- EUROCONTROL guidelines on a process for Civil-military GNSS interference testing – Coordination of state authorized GNSS RFI testing
  - CUAS study could feed the guidelines with recommendations related to the safe use of CUAS (unplanned events).
Characterization of ADS-B Performance Under GNSS Interference

Zixi Liu, Todd Walter, Yu-Hsuan Chen, Sherman Lo, Juan Blanch
GPS Lab, Stanford University
December 2022
Interference Detection and Mitigation (IDM) Workshops

- 10th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 6 December 2022, Vienna, Austria
- 9th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 24 August 2021, Virtual
- 8th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 14 - 15 May 2019, Baska, Croatia
- 7th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 8 - 9 May 2018, Baska, Croatia
- 6th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 9 - 10 May 2017, Baska, Croatia
- GNSS IDM Presentation & Recommendations to the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, 7 February 2017, Vienna, Austria
- 5th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 17 May 2016, Changsha, China
- 4th Interference Detection and Mitigation Workshop, 10 June 2015, Vienna, Austria