



septentrio

Assured GNSS

Attacks and Countermeasures


Stefan Söderholm

23 October 2023

Outline



Septentrio



Jamming

Tesla Model S and Model 3 vulnerable to GNSS spoofing attacks

June 28, 2019 - By [GPS World Staff](#)

Est. reading time: 5 minutes

Autopilot Navigation Steers Car off Road, Research from Regulus Cyber Shows

The **Tesla** Model S and Model 3 — electric cars built for speed and safety — are vulnerable to cyberattacks aimed at their navigation systems, according to recent



Tesla Model 3. (Photo: Tesla)

Spoofing



Test campaign

Septentrio

Assured PNT is key for our customers



@ Interleuvenlaan
Heverlee

Experts in Localization technology



Autonomous Vehicles



Marine



Construction & Mining



UAV



Reference Networks

Modules



Boards



Housed receivers



Smart antenna




Scientific Receivers



Jamming

Jamming


- Jamming, to jam = "squeeze or pack tightly into a specified space"
- Jamming is **always malicious and intentional**
- The interfering signal does not contain any information
- Cause GNSS receivers to stop working or suffer in performance by **adding an interfering signal** to the GNSS frequency band that **saturates** the radio frontend.






- Jammers is often referred to as PPD's (**Personal Privacy Devices**)
- Especially in US it was considered OK to **protect your own privacy** by blocking any GPS receiver your employee might have installed in your car.

Chirp Jammers

- Sinewave with **Changing Frequency**
- Wipes out GPS band(s)




100 mW




- 10 mW over ~20 MHz => 63 dBm/Hz ➔ 2.5 km ➔ Noise Floor: -172 dBm/Hz


Jamming Mitigation: Concept




- General Concept:
 - GPS normally dominated by thermal noise
 - And GPS signals also look like noise



→ So, remove anything which doesn't look like noise






Normal GPS Spectrum



Mitigation Techniques : Chirp Jammers


- Method 1: **Mimick the signal**, and subtract
 - Parameter estimation: frequency-range, chirp-rate, phase
 - Problem: can't deal well with reflections
- Method 2: **FFT** – set peaks to zero - IFFT
 - = FDAF: Frequency Domain Adaptive Filter



Military Grade Anti-Jamming: Beam Forming

- Random Noise at Main Lobes
 - Structure cannot be exploited
- Exploit Geometry
- Multiple Antenna Elements


- Typically uses 4 to 7 antenna elements
- CRPA: Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna



Spoofting

Spoofing


- Spoofing, to spoof = “imitate something, hoax or trick someone”
- Spoofing is **always malicious and intentional**.
- The interfering signal tries to generate and transmit **false GNSS signals**.
- **Fool a receiver** to think it is at different position than it really is.



Pizza Time!




Budget Spoofer

- A spoofer need to :
 - Generate **true GNSS signals** including data, modulation and timing.
 - **Maintain time synchronization** close to true GNSS time.
 - **Adapt the signal power levels** to match those of the true signals.




Detection of Spoofing


- Detect excessive power
 - But can also come from high-gain antenna...
- Detect correlation profile deformation
 - But can also come from multipath...
- Detect divergence
 - But can also come from ionospheric scintillation...
- Detect wrong angle-of-arrival (2 antenna-receivers)
 - But can be reflection....
- Navigation data authentication




Code-Carrier Divergence




- Both Represent Range → Equal
- Only Slow Divergence Expected
 - Ionosphere, Phase Wind Up
- Most SDR:s → Huge Code-carrier Divergence



Wrong Angle of arrival



Single Difference Phase



- A spoofer transmits all signals from the **same location => Same angle of arrival**
- Satellite signals arrive from different angles
- Spoofed measurement from two antennas **will not match**



GALILEO Open Service Navigation Message Authentication

- First Cryptographic Service
- Now running on MOSAIC module



Accurate:

Authentication wrong → Spoofing!
Coherent Attack Protection



Latency: 30 seconds
NTP-Dependency

mosaic-x5-3604546 - RxControl - S/N 3604546

File View Communication **Navigation** GIS L-Band Tools Logging Help

Positioning Mode...
Receiver Operation
Receiver Initialization
Receiver Setup...
Advanced User Settings
Channel Allocation...
Tracking...
Frontend and Interference Mitigation...
PVT...
Galileo OSNMA...

Position Information

Position	Velocity
Geodetic	φ : N 50°
WGS84/ITRS	λ : E 004°43'55,65607 σ_e : +1,289m
	h : +128,546m σ_u : +3,395m

Satellite Status

GPS	GLONASS	Galileo	BeiDou	SBAS	QZSS	NavIC	L-Band				
E01	E02	E03	E04	E05	E06	E07	E08	E09	E10	E11	E12
E13	E14	E15	E16	E17	E18	E19	E20	E21	E22	E23	E24
E25	E26	E27	E28	E29	E30	E31	E32	E33	E34	E35	E36

Search: 5 0G 0R 0E 0C 0S 0J 0I 0L Track: 51 10G 9R 10E 15C 5S 0J 2I 0L
Sync: 0 0G 0R 0E 0C 0S 0J 0I 0L PVT: 9 0G 0R 9E 0C 0S 0J 0I 0L

Receiver Status

Time	RxClock	DOP	PL	RAIM	PVT	Status	Att
GNSS time frame		PDOP: 1,61			Uptime: 0d 06:10:23		
do 28-okt-2021		TDOP: 0,76			CPU Usage: 27%		
21:35:10,700		HDOP: 0,82			IP 10: 35,3kBps		
+18s offset to UTC		VDOP: 1,39			Temp./Volt.: 44 °C / N/A		

SBF Status ExEvent ExSensor

GRB0051 - mosaic-X5 - SEPT

Test Campaign

The Norway Jamming/Spoofing test


- **Organizers:** Norwegian Governmental Organizations, coordination via Testnor




- **When:** September 18th till the 20th 2023
- **Where:** Andøya, Norway
- **Who attended:** 300 participants from various industries



Attack Type: Non-Coherent Attack




- Introduce **jump** of position or time
- Use jamming to **obfuscate** attack




Chirp Jammer: WIMU in Action


Receiver 1: WIMU Off → L1 mostly gone




Receiver 2: WIMU On → L1 is back!




Response to Multi-frequency Chirp Jammer Attack



Receiver:
Mosaic-mini
Dual antenna config
Hi-Target antenna



Receiver:
Mosaic-mini
Single antenna config
Hi-Target antenna




Receiver:
Mosaic-T
Single antenna config
AJ977XF antenna



OSNMA and Atomichron


Position affected with only OSNMA



Did we detect the spoofing?

Undetected spoofing epochs with an error > 10m

Receiver	Total (%)
Competitor 1	67%
Competitor 2	45%
Competitor 3	26%
Septentrio	<1%



Spoofing flags is set for all big outliers!



septentrio^o

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