Assessing the Interrelationship between Intense Geomagnetic Storms and Power Grid Dissruptions in Poland Agnieszka Gil

gila@uph.edu.pl



28 June 2023

(Hybrid format) United Nations Workshop on the International Space Weather Initiative: The Way Forward

Organised by

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

Hosted by

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs



Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo--Humanistyczny w Siedlcach **MOTIVATION:** Our research focuses on investigating strong geomagnetic storms that occurred during the solar cycle 24. These kind of storms appeared not so often, and typically were accompanying by a southwarddirected heliospheric magnetic field Bz. Through the use of different machine learning techniques such as selforganizing maps, we have demonstrated that an increase in the number of transmission line failures, potentially caused by solar activity, was observed during and immediately after strong geomagnetic storms. In addition, we analyzed the evolution of transmission line failures between 2010 and 2014 and observed a linear increase in their frequency, which may be associated with solar activity. To further investigate this connection, we compared these findings with the geoelectric field computed for the region of Poland, utilizing a 1-D layered conductivity Earth model.




Over the Baltic Sea, 27.02.2023, by Rafał Krawczyk




Gdańsk, 24.03.2023, from https://kontakt24.tvn24.pl/zorzapolarna-gdansk-gorki-zachodnie-24-03-2023,4038467,ugc


CME



LASCO


C2 coronagraph instrumen t on the ESA-NASA SOHO spacecraft, was taken 8 January 2002 and shows a widely spreading CME






www.swpc.noaa.gov

Scale	Description	Effect	Physical measure	Average Frequency (1 cycle = 11 years)
65	Extreme	 Power systems: Widespread voltage control problems and protective system problems can occur, some grid systems may experience complete collapse or blackouts. Transformers may experience damage. Spacecraft operations: May experience extensive surface charging, problems with orientation, uplink/downlink and tracking satellites. Other systems: Pipeline currents can reach hundreds of amps, HF (high frequency) radio propagation may be impossible in many areas for one to two days, satellite navigation may be degraded for days, low-frequency radio navigation can be out for hours, and aurora has been seen as low as Florida and southern Texas (typically 40° geomagnetic lat.). 	Kp = 9	4 per cycle (4 days per cycle)
G 4	Severe	 Power systems: Possible widespread voltage control problems and some protective systems will mistakenly trip out key assets from the grid. Spacecraft operations: May experience surface charging and tracking problems, corrections may be needed for orientation problems. Other systems: Induced pipeline currents affect preventive measures, HF radio propagation sporadic, satellite navigation degraded for hours, low-frequency radio navigation disrupted, and aurora has been seen as low as Alabama and northern California (typically 45° geomagnetic lat.). 	Kp = 8, including a 9-	100 per cycle (60 days per cycle)
63	Strong	Power systems: Voltage corrections may be required, false alarms triggered on some protection devices. Spacecraft operations: Surface charging may occur on satellite components, drag may increase on low-Earth- orbit satellites, and corrections may be needed for orientation problems. Other systems: Intermittent satellite navigation and low-frequency radio navigation problems may occur, HF radio may be intermittent, and aurora has been seen as low as Illinois and Oregon (typically 50° geomagnetic lat.).	Kp = 7	200 per cycle (130 days per cycle)
G 2	Moderate	 Power systems: High-latitude power systems may experience voltage alarms, long-duration storms may cause transformer damage. Spacecraft operations: Corrective actions to orientation may be required by ground control; possible changes in drag affect orbit predictions. Other systems: HF radio propagation can fade at higher latitudes, and aurora has been seen as low as New York and Idaho (typically 55° geomagnetic lat.). 	Kp = 6	600 per cycle (360 days per cycle)
G 1	Minor	Power systems: Weak power grid fluctuations can occur. Spacecraft operations: Minor impact on satellite operations possible. Other systems: Migratory animals are affected at this and higher levels; aurora is commonly visible at high latitudes (northern Michigan and Maine).	Kp = 5	1700 per cycle (900 days per cycle)





2023-06-23

2023-06-21

2023-06-22

http://www-app3.gfz-potsdam.de

2023-06-24


2023-06-25

2023-06-26

GIC among other effects

- -electrical grids
- pipelines
- -telecommunication cables
- railway


istp.gsfc.nasa.gov




The effects of magnetic storms - what scientists call space weather - extend from the ground to geostationary orbit and beyond.



Geomagnetically-Induced Currents



Fluctuating Electrojet http://www.metatechcorp.com/ (Millions of Amps)



transition in conductivity between resistive rock geology and seawater Torta et al., 2012: attempt to study and measure GICs in southern European (Spain) power grids, a region considered to have low GIC-risk up to the present

Zois, 2013: Contrary to common belief in PPC Greece, we see that there are considerable both short term (immediate) and long term effects of solar activity onto large transformers in a midlatitude country like Greece


Bailey et al., 2017: We demonstrate that the Austrian power grid is susceptible to large GICs in the range of tens of amperes, particularly from strong geomagnetic variations in the east-west direction.

Tozzi et al., 2019: Results show that during periods of high magnetic activity, potentially detrimental GICs could flow through the power network, especially at the highest Italian latitudes that are characterized by a low conductivity lithosphere.

Švanda et al., 2020: We show that in the 5-day period following the commencement of geomagnetic activity there is an approximately 5-10% increase in the recorded anomalies in the Czech power grid and thus this fraction of anomalies is probably related to an exposure to GICs.

Malmo blackout, 30.10.2003 by GIC


29.10.2003, 07:46 interrupted import from Poland to Sweden, 300 MW, SwePol Link






$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	no.	reasons in 2014	main groups	number	%
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	1	storm		5195	17.2
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	2	ice& snow & rime		124	0.4
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	3	rime		197	0.7
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		rime& tree& branch		271	0.9
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	5	snow		154	0.5
8 wind& tree& branch A: meteorological effects 1761 5.8 9 protection devices 1065 3.5 10 switching 3800 12.6 11 planned breaks 3924 13.0 12 another operator 337 1.1 13 works of own brigades 3800 0.6 15 closed object 160 0.5 16 at the recipient 69 0.2 17 in order to save people 1000 66 19 assembly defects $B:$ operational shutdowns 110 0.4 20 charges, 410 1.4 0.4 21 cutting down trees 132 0.4 0.5 22 fire 105 0.3 2.6 24 aging 2.6 792 2.6 24 aging 0.2 0.4 0.2 25 local impairment of insulation	6	snow& tree& branch		30	0.1
Total A 9004 29.8 9 protection devices 1065 3.5 10 switching 3800 12.6 11 planned breaks 3924 13.0 12 another operator 337 1.1 13 works of own brigades 38 0.1 14 open object 160 0.5 15 closed object 160 0.5 16 at the recipient 69 0.2 17 in order to save people 1 0.0 18 switching activities 6 0.0 19 assembly defects B : operational shutdowns 110 0.4 20 charges, 132 0.4 0.4 21 cutting down trees 132 0.4 0.5 23 digging C : vandalism 145 0.5 24 aging 3135 10.4 0.2 25 local impai	7	wind		1272	4.2
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	8	wind& tree& branch	A: meteorological effects	1761	5.8
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$			Total A	9004	29.8
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	9	protection devices		1065	3.5
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	10	switching		3800	12.6
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c } \hline 13 & works of own brigades \\ \hline 14 & open object \\ \hline 15 & closed object \\ \hline 15 & closed object \\ \hline 16 & at the recipient \\ \hline 17 & in order to save people \\ \hline 18 & switching activities \\ \hline 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 20 & charges, \\ \hline 10 & theft, disassembly \\ \hline 21 & cutting down trees \\ \hline 22 & fire \\ \hline 23 & digging \\ \hline 23 & digging \\ \hline 24 & aging \\ \hline 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ \hline 26 & fuse \\ \hline 79 & power system protection \\ automation and telemechanics \\ \hline 28 & secondary circuits and power \\ system protection automation \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 10 & 1.4 \\ \hline 10 & 1.4 \\ \hline 10 & 0.0 \\ \hline 11 & 0.0 \\ \hline 118 & 3.9 \\ \hline 100 & 1.4 \\ \hline 110 & 0.0 \\ \hline 117 & 0.0 \\ \hline 117 & 0.0 \\ \hline 118 & 3.91 \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 10 & 0.2 \\ \hline 1181 & 3.91 \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 10 & 0.2 \\ \hline$	11	planned breaks		3924	13.0
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 14 & \mbox{open object} & \mbox{15} & \mbox{closed object} & \mbox{16} & \mbox{at the recipient} & \mbox{16} & \mbox{at the recipient} & \mbox{69} & \mbox{0.2} \\ \hline 17 & \mbox{in order to save people} & \mbox{switching activities} & \mbox{B: operational shutdowns} & \mbox{110} & \mbox{0.4} \\ \hline 19 & \mbox{assembly defects} & \mbox{B: operational shutdowns} & \mbox{110} & \mbox{0.4} \\ \hline 10 & \mbox{assembly} & \mbox{assembly} & \mbox{120} & \mbox{assembly} \\ \hline 20 & \mbox{charges,} & \mbox{theft, disassembly} & \mbox{132} & \mbox{0.4} \\ \mbox{by other parties} & \mbox{132} & \mbox{0.4} \\ \mbox{by other parties} & \mbox{145} & \mbox{0.5} \\ \hline 22 & \mbox{fire} & \mbox{145} & \mbox{0.5} \\ \hline 24 & \mbox{aging} & \mbox{C: vandalism} & \mbox{145} & \mbox{0.5} \\ \hline 24 & \mbox{aging} & \mbox{C: aging} & \mbox{3135} & \mbox{10.4} \\ \hline 25 & \mbox{local impairment of insulation} & \mbox{D: aging} & \mbox{3074} & \mbox{10.2} \\ \hline 26 & \mbox{fuse} & \mbox{fuse} & \mbox{1178} & \mbox{3.9} \\ \hline 27 & \mbox{power system protection} \\ \mbox{automation and telemechanics} \\ 28 & \mbox{secondary circuits and power} \\ \mbox{system protection automation} & \mbox{E: electronics devices} & \mbox{2} & \mbox{0.0} \\ \hline 29 & \mbox{unidentified} & \mbox{F: unidentified} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 29 & \mbox{unidentified} & \mbox{F: unidentified} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 29 & \mbox{unidentified} & \mbox{F: unidentified} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 29 & \mbox{unidentified} & \mbox{F: unidentified} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 29 & \mbox{unidentified} & \mbox{F: unidentified} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 20 & \mbox{10} & \mbox{1181} & \mbox{3266} \\ \hline 20 & \mbox{10} & \mbox{1181} & \mbox{3266} & \mbox{10.8} \\ \hline 20 & \mbox{110} & \mbox{110} & \mbox{110} & \mbox{110} & \mbox{11178} & \mbox{11178} & \mbox{11178} & \mbox{11178} & \mbox{11181} & 1118$	12	another operator		337	1.1
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 15 & closed object \\ 16 & at the recipient \\ 17 & in order to save people \\ 18 & switching activities \\ 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 20 & charges, \\ theft, disassembly \\ 21 & cutting down trees \\ by other parties \\ 22 & fire \\ 23 & digging \\ \hline 24 & aging \\ 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ \hline 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ \hline 26 & fuse \\ \hline 27 & power system protection \\ automation and telemechanics \\ 28 & secondary circuits and power \\ system protection automation \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 160 & 0.5 \\ \hline 69 & 0.2 \\ \hline 10 & 0.6 \\ \hline 10 & 0.0 \\ \hline 110 & 0.4 \\ \hline 10 & 0.4 \\ \hline 110 & 0.4 \\ \hline 11181 & 3.91 \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 110 & 0.2 \\ \hline 100 & 0 \\ \hline 110 & 0 \\ \hline 11181 & 3.91 \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 110 & 0 \\ \hline $	13	works of own brigades		38	0.1
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c } \hline 16 & at the recipient \\ 17 & in order to save people \\ 18 & switching activities \\ 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 20 & charges, \\ theft, disassembly \\ 21 & cutting down trees \\ by other parties \\ 22 & fire \\ 23 & digging \\ \hline 23 & digging \\ \hline 24 & aging \\ 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ \hline 26 & fuse \\ 27 & power system protection \\ automation and telemechanics \\ 28 & secondary circuits and power \\ system protection automation \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 16 & 0.0 \\ \hline 10 & 0.4 \\ \hline 1178 & 3.9 \\ \hline 1181 & 3.91 \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline F: unidentified \\ \hline 3266 & 10.8 \\ \hline 10 & 326 & 10 \\ \hline 10 & 10 & 10 \\ \hline 10 & 10 & 10 \\ \hline 10 & 10 & 10 \\ \hline 10 & $	14	open object		193	0.6
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 17 & \text{in order to save people} \\ 18 & \text{switching activities} \\ 19 & \text{assembly defects} \\ \hline 19 & \text{assembly defects} \\ \hline 10 & \text{be operational shutdowns} \\ \hline 10 & 0.4 \\ \hline 10 & 0.4 \\ \hline 10 & 0.4 \\ \hline 9703 & 32.0 \\ \hline 20 & \text{charges,} \\ \hline 10 & 1.4 \\ \hline 140 & 1.4 \\ \hline 132 & 0.4 \\ \hline 105 & 0.3 \\ \hline 23 & \text{digging} \\ \hline 22 & \text{fire} \\ \hline 105 & 0.3 \\ \hline 145 & 0.5 \\ \hline 702 & 2.6 \\ \hline 24 & \text{aging} \\ 10cal \text{ impairment of insulation} \\ \hline 25 & \text{local impairment of insulation} \\ \hline 26 & \text{fuse} \\ 27 & \text{power system protection} \\ \text{automation and telemechanics} \\ 28 & \text{secondary circuits and power} \\ 8 & \text{secondary circuits and power} \\ 29 & \text{unidentified} \\ \hline 29 & \text{unidentified} \\ \hline F: \text{unidentified} \\ \hline 3266 & 10.8 \\ \hline \end{array}$	15	closed object		160	0.5
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c } \hline 18 & switching activities \\ 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 19 & assembly defects \\ \hline 10 & assembly defects \\ \hline 110 & 0.4 \\ \hline 110 & 0.4 \\ \hline 9703 & 32.0 \\ \hline 0.4 \\ \hline 9703 & 32.0 \\ \hline 32.$	16	at the recipient		69	0.2
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c } \hline 19 & assembly defects & B: operational shutdowns & 110 & 0.4 \\ \hline & Total B & 9703 & 32.0 \\ \hline 20 & charges, & & 410 & 1.4 \\ & theft, disassembly & & & 132 & 0.4 \\ & by other parties & & & & 132 & 0.4 \\ & by other parties & & & & & 105 & 0.3 \\ \hline 22 & fire & & & & & 105 & 0.3 \\ \hline 23 & digging & C: vandalism & 145 & 0.5 \\ \hline & & & & & & & & 145 & 0.5 \\ \hline & & & & & & & & & & 145 & 0.5 \\ \hline 24 & aging & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ local impairment of insulation & D: aging & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ \hline 26 & fuse & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & \\ 26 & fuse & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &$	17	in order to save people		1	0.0
Total B970332.020charges, theft, disassembly4101.421cutting down trees by other parties1320.422fire digging1050.323diggingC: vandalism1450.524aging local impairment of insulationD: aging307410.226fuse power system protection automation and telemechanics system protection automation10.028secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	18	switching activities		6	0.0
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 20 & charges, & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &$	19	assembly defects	B: operational shutdowns	110	0.4
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c } \hline the ft, disassembly \\ cutting down trees \\ by other parties \\ 22 & fire \\ 23 & digging \\ \hline 23 & digging \\ \hline 24 & aging \\ 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ \hline 25 & local impairment of insulation \\ 26 & fuse \\ 27 & power system protection \\ automation and telemechanics \\ 28 & secondary circuits and power \\ system protection automation \\ \hline 28 & secondary circuits and power \\ system protection automation \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 29 & unidentified \\ \hline 132 & 0.4 \\ 105 & 0.3 \\ \hline 145 & 0.5 \\ \hline 792 & 2.6 \\ \hline 792 &$			Total B	9703	32.0
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	20	charges,		410	1.4
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		theft, disassembly			
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	21	cutting down trees		132	0.4
23diggingC: vandalism Total C1450.524aging313510.425local impairment of insulationD: aging Total D307410.226fuse10.027power system protection automation and telemechanics system protection automation11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8		by other parties			
Total C7922.624aging313510.425local impairment of insulationD: aging307410.226fuse10.020.627power system protection automation and telemechanics secondary circuits and power system protection automation11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	22	fire		105	0.3
24 25aging local impairment of insulationD: aging Total D3135 307410.4 10.226 27fuse power system protection automation and telemechanics secondary circuits and power system protection automation10.0 11783.928 28 29secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.0 118129unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	23	digging	C: vandalism	145	0.5
25local impairment of insulationD: aging Total D3074 620910.2 20.626fuse10.027power system protection automation and telemechanics secondary circuits and power system protection automation11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8			Total C	792	2.6
Image: Constraint of the second system protection automation and telemechanicsTotal D620920.626fuse10.027power system protection automation and telemechanics11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8				3135	10.4
26fuse10.027power system protection automation and telemechanics11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices20.0Total E11813.9129unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	25	local impairment of insulation	D: aging	3074	10.2
27power system protection automation and telemechanics secondary circuits and power system protection automation11783.928secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices Total E20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8			Total D	6209	20.6
automation and telemechanics secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices20.029unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	26	fuse		1	0.0
28secondary circuits and power system protection automationE: electronics devices20.0Total E11813.9129unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8	27	power system protection		1178	3.9
system protection automationE: electronics devices20.0Total E11813.9129unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8		automation and telemechanics			
Total E 1181 3.91 29 unidentified F: unidentified 3266 10.8	28	secondary circuits and power			
29unidentifiedF: unidentified326610.8		system protection automation	E: electronics devices	2	0.0
				1181	3.91
TOTAL 30155 100.0	29	unidentified	F: unidentified	3266	10.8
			TOTAL	30155	100.0

Gil et al., 2019a, doi: 10.1186/s13362-019-0064-9



Groups (numbers as in the left column of the Table) and six general clusters of the EGF causes in 2014



Geoelectric Field Computation, Transfer Function - 1D model

Earth conductivity varies in all directions, but the greatest variation is with depth

Layered Conductivity Model

N layers, each specified by conductivity (σ_n) and thickness (I_n)

$$K_n = \eta_n \frac{K_{n+1}(1 + e^{-2k_n l_n}) + \eta_n (1 - e^{-2k_n l_n})}{K_{n+1}(1 - e^{-2k_n l_n}) + \eta_n (1 + e^{-2k_n l_n})}$$

$$\eta_n = \frac{i2\pi f}{k_n}$$

$$k_n = \sqrt{i2\pi f \mu_0 \sigma_n}$$

$$\mu_0 = 4\pi 10^{-7} \mathrm{H}^{-1} \mathrm{m}$$

$$K_N = \sqrt{\frac{i2\pi f}{\mu_0 \sigma_N}}$$

Boteler, 1994; Boteler, 2012; Boteler and Pirjola, 2019

B(t)

 $F\left\{ B\left(t
ight)
ight\}$

K(f)

 $E\left(t
ight)=F^{-1}\left[K\left(f
ight)F\left\{B\left(t
ight)
ight\}
ight]$

	10"	_	-5'	0,	5	5	10'	15'	20'	25'	30°	35"	40"	45'	50'	55'	60"
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
70'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	25	26	26	0	0	0	0	70
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	26	26	24	26	26	57	0	0	
65°	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	25	25	25	- 24	24	24	57	0	0	65
60'	0	0	0	0	24	24	24	25	25 25	25	25	24	24	57	0	0	60
	0	19	19	0	0	24	24-	24 26	24	41	25	25	\$ 24	57	0	0	
55'	0	19 20 21	20 21	21	0	0	48	26	10		40	25	4	57	0	0	55
	21	22	22	22	47	47	12	ų	10	40	40	2 4	4	57	0	0	ţ.
50'		.22	22 23	22	47	47	13	14	45	9	43	6	6	57	0	0	50
	0	0	38 38	38 38	38	35	15 55	39	17	42	43	5	6	57	0	0	-
45'	0	0	0	37	37	55	54	54	S	8	31	0 -	0	0	0	0	45
	0	29	29	37	34	36	53	53	58	56	31	0	0	0	0	0	1
40'		-29	29	29	29		, 49	49	58	32	-31	0	0	0	0	lo	40
		30	46	46 . 28	0	0	.50	51	52	2	0	<u>_</u> 0	0	202	0	0	
35'	30	30	28		0	0	0	50	0	33	0	0 \$	-07	40	0	0	35
	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	05	0	0	. 0	0	
30"	10		-5'	0'	6		10'	15'	20'	25"	30"	35'	40*	45'	50'	55'	60' 30

Number of layers Conductivity ($\sigma=1/\rho$) Thickness (I=d) Layer \mathbf{d} \mathbf{d} ρ ϱ Ωm Ωm \mathbf{km} \mathbf{km} Model 1 Model 2 20.0040.00 0.400.101 $\mathbf{2}$ 170.003.001.304.003 2000.00140.0065.0011.904 118.00 170.0017.0050.00 $\mathbf{5}$ 15.000.20Model 3 Model 12 4.005.003.001.001 $\mathbf{2}$ 1000.00 57.00200.004.003 10.000.501.50 $\mathbf{4}$ 200.002.001000.00 $\mathbf{5}$ 100.00

Figure: 1D resistivity models in Europe

Adam et al., EURISGIC, FP7, 2012

10.00

6




Figure 6. The 2-D spatial structure of geoelectric fields *E* at 00:31:20 UT, 09:00:00 UT, 17:54:40 UT, on 8 September 2017, reconstructed from the IMAGE magnetometers using the 1-D conductivity model. Color coding indicates log₁₀(*IE*) [mV/km].




Figure 9. Time variation of geomagnetically induced currents values, determined for period between 17:49 UT and 18:01 UT on 8 September 2017. Results for six selected power substations: Pirttikoski, Imatra, Kouvola, Mäntsälä (MAN), Hämeenlinna and Simpevarp-2, listed in Table 2 have been shown.


Wawrzaszek et al., 2023, doi: 10.1029/2022SW003383


List of the intense geomagnetic storms in January 2010–July 2014.


Gil et al., 2021, doi: 10.1051/swsc/2021013

Date	DOY	Duration in [h] of: <i>B_Z</i> <	<i>Bz</i> min	<i>Dst</i> min	<i>AE</i> max	B max	<i>SWd</i> max	<i>SWs</i> max	<i>ap</i> max	<i>K</i> max	Fast halo CME
		-10/ <i>Dst</i> < -100	[nT] [*]	[nT] ^{**}	[nT]	[nT]	[N/cm ³]	[km/s]	[nT]		appearance
29.05.2010	149	12/0	-13.8	-80	1293	14.4	18.1	362	56	4	-
26-27.09.2011	269–270	1+2/4	-24.1	-118	1842	34.2	27	688	94	6	+
25.10.2011	298	1/8	-12.8	-147	1042	24	23.4	534	154	7	+
09.03.2012	69	6/11	-16.4	-145	1785	22.3	7.1	741	207	6	+
23-24.04.2012	114–115	10/2+4	-15.4	-120	1383	15.5	38.8	600	111	6	-
17.06.2012	169	6/0	-16.5	-86	1292	40.1	38.6	515	80	5	+
09.07.2012	191	4/0	-11.4	-78	1259	12.3	13.3	441	111	6	+
15-16.07.2012	197–198	29/26	-18.7	-139	1368	27.3	20.7	665	132	7	+
01.10.2012	275	4/6	-19.2	-122	987	21	23	411	111	6	+
08-09.10.2012	282–283	5+13/1+2+2	-15.1	-105	1000	16.3	20.7	527	111	6	-
01.11.2012	306	6/0	-11.7	-65	1270	15.8	26.2	373	39	4	-
14.11.2012	319	9/3	-17.4	-108	1009	22.3	14.8	467	94	6	-
17.01.2013	17	4/0	-12.3	-52	669	14.7	44.4	418	27	5	-
17.03.2013	76	1+1/5	-14.4	-132	1822	17.8	14	721	111	6	+
01.06.2013	152	7/7	-17.4	-124	1217	19.6	26.7	683	132	6	-
06-07.06.2013	157-158	7/0	-11.7	-78	1181	13.4	11.2	512	67	5	-
28-29.06.2013	179–180	12/1+1	-11.9	-102	1317	13.0	27.3	462	94	5	+
06.07.2013	187	10/0	-12.5	-87	1303	12.8	8.7	369	39	4	-
19.02.2014	50	4/2	-12.9	-119	1198	18.6	20.6	534	94	6	+


* Values for which Bz < -10 nT lasted for more than 3 h are shown in bold. ** Values for which Dst < -100 nT lasted for more than 3 h are shown in bold.







Gil et al., 2021, doi: 10.1051/swsc/2021013




SOM neighbour weight distances 0.9 with weight values of connections 8.0 between neighboring neurons for the intense geomagnetic storm 0.6 19.02.2014. The blue hexagons 0,5 0.4 represent neurons, and the red 0.3 lines show which particular 0.2 neurons are connected. Colors from black to yellow display the weight values of the connection between neighboring neurons

0.7

0.1

Gil et al., 2023, doi: 10.1007/s11207-023-02119-4



PCA biplot around the intense geomagnetic storm on 19 February 2014

Gil et al., 2023, doi: 10.1007/s11207-023-02119-4




Figure 11. Dendrograms presenting the Ward's linkage of the solar activity parameters and three types of failure (Ag, Ed, Un) during the geomagnetic storm on 19.02.2014

Gil et al., 2023, doi: 10.1007/s11207-023-02119-4

Summary

- We find that the yearly average number of transmission lines failures (which might be of solar origin, i.e. from clusters D-F) in the South Poland show a rising trend from 2010 (near SA min) to 2014 (SA max). Thus, it can be an indication of solar cycle phase dependency.
- The presented rapid growth of the number of electrical grids failures coincides in time (mostly with some delay) with an increase of geomagnetic activity mirrored in the increase of geoelectric field disturbances reflected in GICs. This suggests a link to the space weather effects. The mentioned delay in EGFs emergence may be connected to some cumulative effect due to the result of transient states and their propagation in the distribution network.
- SOM, PCA and HAC analysis showed that the solar-wind parameters have the most substantial connections with all the considered types of electric—grid failures in southern Poland in all the storms under study. These parameters are usually grouped in the same cluster with failures in more than 80% of the results.

Thank you!

Thank you!

Acknowledgements

- HMF, SW parameters and geomagnetic indexes are from omniweb.gsfc.nasa.gov;
- This work was partially supported by the Polish Ministry of Education and Science (grant number DNK/SP/549572/2022) and the Polish National Science Centre (grant number 2016/22/E/HS5/00406)

References:

- Analysis of Geoeffective Impulsive Events on the Sun During the First Half of Solar Cycle 24/ Gil A, Berendt-Marchel M, Modzelewska R, Siluszyk A, Siluszyk M, Wawrzaszek A, Wawrzynczak A. //Solar Physics 298(2), (2023)
- Analysis of Large Geomagnetically Induced Currents During the 7–8 September 2017 Storm: Geoelectric Field Mapping, A. Wawrzaszek, A. Gil, R. Modzelewska, B. Tsurutani, R. Wawrzaszek// Space Weather 21(3), (2023)
- Fractal Dimension Analysis of Earth Magnetic Field during 26 August 2018 Geomagnetic Storm/ Wawrzaszek A., Modzelewska R, Krasinska A, Gil A, Glavan V//Entropy 24(5):699 (2022)
- Evaluating the relationship between strong geomagnetic storms and electric grid failures in Poland using the geoelectric field as a GIC proxy/ Gil A, Berendt-Marchel M, Modzelewska R, Moskwa S, Siluszyk A, Siluszyk M., Tomasik L., Wawrzaszek A., Wawrzynczak A. //Journal of Space Weather and Space Climate 11, 30 (2021)
- Solar Rotation Multiples in Space-Weather Effects/ Gil A, Modzelewska R, Wawrzaszek A., Piekart B., Milosz T. //Solar Physics 296, 128 (2021)
- Katz Fractal Dimension of Geoelectric Field during Severe Geomagnetic Storms/ Gil A, Glavan V, Wawrzaszek A., Modzelewska R, Tomasik L //Entropy 23(11), 1531 (2021)
- Signs of geoeffective space weather events in cosmic rays during the first half of the solar cycle 24/ Gil A, Modzelewska R, Moskwa Sz, Siluszyk A, Siluszyk M, Wawrzaszek A, Wawrzynczak A //In: NMDB@Home 2020: Proceedings of the 1st virtual symposium on cosmic ray studies with neutron detectors. Kiel: Universitätsverlag Kiel | Kiel University Publishing. S. 119–124 (2021)
- Transmission Lines in Poland and Space Weather Effects / Agnieszka Gil, Renata Modzelewska, Szczepan Moskwa, Agnieszka Siluszyk, Marek Siluszyk, Anna Wawrzynczak, Mariusz Pozoga, Sebastian Domijanski. // Energies. Vol. 13, nr 9 (2020), s. 1-13
- The solar event of 14 15 July 2012 and its geoeffectiveness / Agnieszka Gil, Renata Modzelewska, Szczepan Moskwa, Agnieszka Siłuszyk, Marek Siłuszyk, Anna Wawrzyńczak, Mariusz Pozoga, Łukasz Tomasik. // SOLAR PHYSICS. - Vol. 295, no 10 (2020), art. no 135, s. 1-16.
- Struktura wiekowa polskiej infrastruktury energetycznej / Sylwia Zakrzewska, Agnieszka Gil-Świderska, Paweł Szmitkowski. // Rynek Energii. 2 (147) (2020), s. 8-23.
- Does time series analysis confirms the relationship between space weather effects and the failures of electrical grids in South Poland? / A. Gil, R. Modzelewska, Sz. Moskwa, A. Siłuszyk, M. Siłuszyk, A. Wawrzyńczak, S. Zakrzewska. // Journal of mathematics in industry. 2019, Vol. 9, art no 7, s. 1-16.
- Neural net clustering in the study of electrical grids failures in relation to geomagnetic storms / Agnieszka Siłuszyk, Agnieszka Gil, Renata Modzelewska, Szczepan Moskwa, Marek Siłuszyk, Agnieszka Wawrzyńczak. // Journal of Physics. Conference Series. - Vol. 1391 (2019), art. no 012107, s. 1-15.
- Capabilities of Polish power plants advantages and threats / P. Szmitkowski, S. Zakrzewska, A. Gil, P. Świderski. // Przegląd Elektrotechniczny. R. 95, nr 5 (2019)
- Electrical energy infrastructure in Poland and its sensitivity to failures as part of the energy security system / P. Szmitkowski, A. Gil, S. Zakrzewska. // Energy Policy J.. 22, 1 (2019)