



Vulnerability

new tool and measure for GNSS

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- ⦿ Situations of current GNSS
- ⦿ Vulnerability study
- ⦿ Research roadmap of SJTU
- ⦿ Conclusion

PNT: critical infrastructure



- ① PNT has become a critical infrastructure; virtually the indispensable one the others (power, telecommunication, etc.) rely on.
- ② Space-based PNT (GNSS) is the primary PNT source; no alternatives available to provide competing performance.



GNSS Threats and Consequences



- ④ Space
 - S.V. failure
- ④ Environment
 - Solar activity
 - Ionosphere scintillation and disturbance
- ④ Spectrum
 - Unintentional RF Interference
 - Intentional Jamming
 - Spoofing
- ④ Local
 - Restricted Line-of-sight
 - Multipath




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 - Restricted Line-of-sight
 - Multipath
- ④ Degradation of accuracy
- ④ Required performance not met
- ④ PNT service unavailable
- ④ Hazardous misleading information (HMI)

Current situation



Current GNSS performance standards

- Accuracy
- Integrity
- Continuity
- Availability



- Performance is evaluated merely by PNT solution.
- Intricate information is simplified and partly discarded.
- Interferences and disturbances are not counted.




GNSS provider side

- System health: inadequate attention
- Threats and risks: not well covered
- Performance: not guaranteed (especially for civil/public service)

User side

- Increasing concerns
- No effective and generalized countermeasures
- GNSS dependency is discouraged
- Non-GNSS backups chosen (which is of low performance yet high cost)

User Expectations not met






Vulnerability: definition



- ⊙ **The degree that GNSS users maintain minimum performance requirement and improve service quality under adverse circumstances.**
- ⊙ Origins: unexpected or excessive interferences and anomalies
- ⊙ Native property of GNSS (virtually of any other complex systems)
- ⊙ Another performance criterion (orthogonal with current ones)



Multi-dimensional insight

- ① The research and improvements on the vulnerability issue
- ② Objectives
 - Research GNSS vulnerability theories
 - Determine application vulnerability tolerance
 - Introduce more robust , reliable and accurate GNSS
 - Enable authentic (trusted) PNT service.
 - SBAS is included as part of space-based PNT.
 - Provide performance-guaranteed service to general civil applications.

Actions and goals


| Party | Actions | Gains | Target |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| User | Interference study | Detection and alleviation techniques | Achieving more trustworthy and robust PNT solution out of GNSS. |
| | Vulnerability monitoring | Monitoring and information distribution service | |
| Provider | Re-evaluate | System vulnerability assessment | Providing more reliable GNSS service. |
| | Improve | Vulnerability improvement measures | |

Content

- Possible disturbing source and influencing mechanism

Outputs


- Assessment result
- Immunity to vulnerability
 - New band, code, modulation, etc.
 - Multi-constellation, Multi-band operation
 - Fail-safe backups





Connotations 2: User awareness

- Application-specific vulnerability tolerance
- IDM on receiver side
 - Combination of all possible approaches
 - A composite of existing and new methods.




Connotations 3: Monitoring Station and Service



Responsibilities

- Monitor: Disturbing factors
- Evaluate: Vulnerability status
- Broadcast and warning service

Ultimate vulnerability improvement approach





⦿ Functions

- Evaluate SIS
- Detect anomalies
- Diagnosis and identify disturbances
- Reconstruct and locate sources
- Generate corrections/solutions
- Broadcast and warn users of situation



Ensure quality of PNT service


⦿ Characteristics

- Including both electrical instruments and GNSS receivers
- Locally coverage
- Grid located to form seamless coverage with variable radius and flexible density depending on requirement


Monitoring Station: Architecture (Preliminary)



Unidirectional Choke-Ring
GNSS antenna




Dish antenna: high gain, narrow beam
To search for and track interferences and anomalies




Directional Dish
antenna


Power combiner and multiplexer




Spectrum/Signal
Analyzer



GNSS SDR



Monitoring
Algorithm



Generate and distribute monitoring results

SA: analyze
unexpected signals

Monitoring Station: Comparison



| | Ground Monitoring Station | Continuous Operating Reference Station (CORS) | Vulnerability Monitoring Station |
|------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Application | S.V. monitoring and control | Reference/differential data | Interference identification and tracking |
| Purpose | Maintenance | Precision | Quality |
| Mode of function | N/A | Passive | Active |
| Owner | Provider | User | Third-party |
| Role | Infrastructure (Ground Segment) | Augmentation Facility | Local component |



Research Roadmap (SJTU)



1. Lab Vulnerability Playback and Simulation Research Facility (by 2012)
2. Demonstration station (by 2013)
 - Research oriented
3. Provincial deployment and validation
 - several stations to cover Shanghai and adjacent provinces.



Lab Facility (ongoing)




⦿ Functions

- Playback and simulate GNSS threatened scenarios
- Evaluate receiver(h/w and s/w) performance

⦿ Purpose

- Research the impaired performance and solutions




Lab Vulnerability Playback and Simulation Research Facility



- ④ International focus and study welcomed
- ④ Mutually agreed understandings
- ④ Joint-built monitoring stations featuring multi-constellation capability favored
- ④ Work for common benefits



Conclusions



- ① A new measure of service performance
- ① A new approach for performance enhancement
- ① For users' benefits
- ① Valuable vulnerability alleviating methods expected from relevant research
- ① International cooperated research welcomed



谢谢！
Thanks for your attention!

